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INTRODUCTION

The deterioration of the earth's physical environment presently
represents a phenomenon which international society has never faced
before. The current legal and political approach to global environmental
crises appears largely inadequate as an effective response to this
deterioration. International law, due to its very foundations, is unable to
cope with global environmental degradation as it does not provide a clear
and compelling direction for states to work collectively toward a common
goal.
To investigate specifically why international law is largely
inadequate in the face of current environmental crises, it is necessary to
explore the main sources, the very roots, of international law. There are
three main sources of international law, as identified by article 38,
paragraph 1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: treaties,

customs, and the general principles of law.'

These three sources are

*
Candidate for Ph. D. in International Environmental Law, University of Queensland,
Brisbane, Australia; The author wishes to express appreciation to Dr. Marianne Hanson and Dr.
Von Fletcher for their assistance and advice and to Mr. Sean Cambage for his support and
encouragement.
1. U. N. CHARTER art. 38, 1. These three sources, among others, are recognized as the
main sources of international law. See JOSEPH G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 33 (10th ed. 1989); MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 23 (1987); LEO GROSS, SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION

27 (1993); U.N. CHARTER art. 2,

1; PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW

AND THE ENVIRONMENT 11 (1992); Patricia Birnie, The Role of InternationalLaw in Solving
Certain Environmental Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY:

THE

MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF TRANSFRONTIER ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 98 (John

Carroll ed.,

1988) [hereinafter Birnie, The Role of International Law]; Patricia Birnie,

172

ILSA Journalof Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 2:171

unable to create an adequate international response to the rapid devastation
of various aspects of the earth's environment. They do not provide a
sufficient framework for cooperation and collective environmental action
among states. This paper will develop an evaluation of these three
international legal sources within the global environmental context and
provide a critique of the current international legal system as a guideline of
state behavior.
International law may be defined as "that body of law which is
composed for its greater part of the principles and rules of conduct which
states feel themselves bound to observe, and therefore, do commonly
observe in their relations with each other." 2 It is further described as that
body "which binds states and other agents in world politics in their
relations with one another and is considered to have the status of law." 3
The states which comprise the international system are bound by respective
and collective rights and obligations under a structured legal system, and
state behavior is constructed around this set of commonly recognized
norms and rules. International law "provides a normative framework
within which and with reference to which states take their decisions. "'
Overall, the structure of international law has produced various
successful outcomes as states have agreed on a wide range of issues.
These range from the size and appearance of air mail stamps to the
regulation of export wheat quotas to the elimination of atmospheric nuclear
testing, of which most are maintained on a regular basis. Hundreds of
bilateral and multilateral treaties covering a diverse range of issues have
provided states, and their citizens, with certain expectations regarding the
behavior of other states. Though international law, on its own, is never
completely successful in any area of international relations, it generally
appears to have produced comparatively successful resolutions through
wide-spread national compliance.
However, state behavior is still often interpreted within a zero-sum
perception. A zero-sum perception is the belief that a state benefits only at
the expense of another's loss, and the possibility for collective action to
achieve common goals is minimized by the traditional design and structure
of the international legal system. The formation of the international legal
International Environmental Law:
Its Adequacy for Present and Future Needs, in
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framework, as a medium of interstate relations, was a means to restrict
random and self-serving action by powerful states. This framework was
also designed to relieve uncertainty and tension within the international
community, to the end of reducing conflicting situations. International law
was developed to regulate the conflicting interests and unilateral behavior
of sovereign states. The interest of one state was balanced against the
interest of others, the perception being that the interest of each state was
inherently different. The establishment of international law was necessary
to enable states to advance their own sovereign interests, while attempting
to reduce conflict and violent competition between states.
Environmental degradation has created a situation in which
immediate competing state interests are not the exclusive factors in legal
negotiations as there is an element of potential loss which is held in
common, to a certain degree, by all states. Due to this relatively recent
and unique situation in international relations, the structure of international
law presently appears to be ill-equipped to create effective collective
solutions. Indeed, the notion of state sovereignty as a cornerstone of
international law hinders the development of collective agreement and
global action.
All states now share a common interest that is inherent to their
survival, both as sovereign constructs, and also as collections of
individuals with a need for the preservation of physical conditions
necessary to sustain life. Natural resources, shared by all of humanity, are
being eroded away and many regions of the world are now faced with the
possibility of irreversible physical, social, and economic destruction. The
ability of many states to develop and improve the lifestyles of their citizens
will be impeded by the continued abuse of the delicate natural cycle.' Yet,
the traditional guide for behavior within the international community and
the international legal system is inadequate to direct the collective
interaction of sovereign states toward a common goal of environmental
The very structure of international law appears to be
protection.
insufficient to respond to the increasing environmental crises that the earth
is presently straining under as it struggles to support the demands of its
inhabitants. This international legal structure, comprised of the three main
sources of international law, will direct the focus of this paper, and it is to
the predominant and most inclusive of these legal sources to which this
paper now turns.

5.
For a related and detailed discussion of issues concerning environmental degradation
and potential international consequences see WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987) [hereinafter WORLD COMMISSION].
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES

All states vehemently protect their individual sovereignty, and the
right to legislate and regulate activities within their own areas of
jurisdiction. The general principles of international law are components of
an international system which is concentrated upon the supremacy of
individual state sovereignty. This system has developed over the past few
centuries around a Euro-centric Westphalian perspective. It has now
evolved to the level of acceptance of the status quo as being morally right
and just. The ability of states to utilize and exploit the physical territory
they each occupy, for their own gain, is interpreted in international law as
an inherent right of sovereign states.
However, the increasing
environmentally destructive impact of states' behavior now challenges the
traditional structure of sovereignty upon which these legal principles were
founded.
The International Court of Justice, as the exclusive global judicial
body, is instructed by Article 38(1)(c) of its statute, to further the sources
of custom and treaties, to apply "the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations in its decisions."6
In the context of the global
environment, this major source of international law does not seem
compatible with necessary cooperative action. The design of the general
principles of law in the international system reflects the realist, difficult
approach to interstate relations. The main function of these principles is to
maintain the internal and external sovereignty of states while attempting to
minimize the opportunities for noncompliance with international law. The
basic objectives of the general principles of law are to reduce conflict by
ensuring the equal rights and responsibilities of all sovereign states.
Though the protection of sovereignty appears to be integral to the
functioning of the state system, this principle also seems to be increasingly
incompatible with the need for collectively
addressing global
environmental problems. The environment does not fit neatly into the
traditional conception of international relations.
It is a common problem with a potentially permanent impact upon
all states, and not an issue that can be resolved through the usual legal
process of negotiation based exclusively upon the short term, immediate
interests of sovereign states. As "the first function of international law has
been to identify, as the supreme normative principle of the political
organization of mankind [sic], the idea of a society of sovereign states,",

6.

See GENNADII M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

173 (1993); STARKE, supra note 1, at 33.
7.

BULL, supra note 3, at 140.
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this system is unsuitable for collective action which transgresses political
boundaries.
The general principles of international law influence the ways in
which states choose to act within the international system as they form part
of the normative framework of international relations and interstate
behavior. The concept of the supremacy of state sovereignty is intertwined
with the functioning of international law overall. This creates a unique
and seemingly insurmountable dilemma in terms of the global
environment, as the adherence to sovereign national interests contrasts
with the ability of states to collectively act within the global interest.
Separate national, economic, political interests, and the continual desire of
states to improve their relative standing in the international community
takes precedence over the need for common global action." As states
continually work to protect their own interests, divisive barriers to
cooperation are continually created. The earth's environment cannot be
divided into particular territories over which separate political bodies
assume rights and responsibilities, as the consequences of physical
environmental degradation in one area of the globe may be observed in
another. Yet as this fragmented political system based on the competition
of individual state interests is now faced with the impending task of
cooperating to solve environmental problems, it seems inadequately
equipped to collectively defeat an encroaching common foe.
On the one hand we have a conception of a world divided
into separate, independent communities, delineated clearly
in time and space, governed by their own sovereign
authority and system of law. On the other hand is a
conception of a physical, ecological, and social totality, a
single community of humans and other species, ultimately
governed equally by natural law. 9
The supremacy of state sovereignty may be observed within
international law, as indicated by the fact that the only subjects of
international law are independent sovereign states.' 0 States are the only
8.
See John Vogler, Regimes and the Global Commons: Space, Atmosphere, and Ocean,
in GLOBAL POLITICS: GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATION-STATE 127 (Andrew G. McGrew et
al. eds., 1992).
9. JOSEPH CAMILLERI ET AL., THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY?
SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD 172 (1992).

THE POLITICS OF A

10. Though individuals and private companies may bring proceedings to the European
Union's Court of First Instance of the European Court of Justice and individuals may present
cases to the Council of Europe's European Court of Human Rights after the exhaustion of all
legal avenues within their own state, these are regional bodies and are therefore necessarily
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recognized subjects within the international legal system, but they are not
the only actors within the international community. Only states may bring
claims to the International Court of Justice to seek restitution for
environmental damage. Concurrently, only states may be found liable for
environmental damage, and asked to pay damages to another state. This
principle does not enable all relevant parties to international environmental
nongovernmental
corporations,
multinational
as
issues-such
the
regulations of
organizations, or individuals-to be either protected by
the international legal system or bound by its limitations." Nonstate actors
are not included in the creation and implementation of environmental
solutions despite the fact that the sustainability of the earth's physical
structure is an inherent interest of all global citizens, both immediately and
in the long-term perspective. Therefore, if it is not in the immediate best
interest of a state to pursue the costly and time-consuming process of
international adjudication, sources of environmental degradation will be
allowed to continue the erosion of further natural resources unchecked.
Additionally, the global commons-areas of the globe that do not
fall within a specified jurisdiction of any one state-cannot be sufficiently
protected by the general principles of international law. It is not clear
who, if anyone, is responsible for the environmental preservation of these
areas; as only states are subjects of international law, then only states may
make claims in regard to environmental damage within these areas. As
there is little to be gained from furthering a state's national interest by
expending national finances to protect a territory which may not be
perceived as offering any immediate national benefit, states are reluctant to
adopt this course of action. This inevitably leaves the commons, which
limited in their scope. The International Court of Justice is the exclusive global legal institution,
and it solely recognizes states as having the status of legal subjects. See L. NEVILLE BROWN &
TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (4th ed. 1994);
MARK W. JANIS & RICHARD S. KAY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (1990).

11.

After the Exxon-Valdez oil spill in the Gulf of Alaska occurred on March 24, 1989, all

remedies were dealt with domestically, as the environmental damage was limited to American

territory and was caused by an American corporation. Additionally, after a BHP tanker created
an oil spill off the coast of Tasmania on July 11, 1995, the corporation initially accepted
responsibility and began to assist with clean-up operations that were launched by the State
Government of Tasmania and the Federal Government of Australia; it later denied any admission

of liability, but continued to assist with environmental restoration.

As in the former case,

environmental damage was limited to domestic territory, caused by an Australian company, and

if BHP had not continued to assist with environmental restoration, the Australian government
would have been able to seek remedies through its domestic legal system.

If either of these

incidents had occurred in international territory (the global commons), or if the damage had been
caused by a foreign corporation, the measures which may have been taken by either state to seek
restitution are uncertain. Under the current system of international law, remedies do not exist
whereby multinational corporations may be held legally accountable for environmental damage.
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include the high seas, outer space, and the atmosphere, most vulnerable to
environmental damage.
Though multinational treaties have been
negotiated to recognize these areas as shared resources of humankind, and
appropriate environmental behavior is outlined for signatory states,
specific procedures do not exist as a response to pollution in these common
areas. For example, any amendments to state behavior which will further
the protection of the Antarctic are limited to the twelve states which
originally signed the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, and should another state
violate the environmental sanctity of this territory, it is unclear what action
would be taken.', Overall, international law does not provide relevant
guidance as to what course of action must be taken, and by which legal
actors, to ensure the preservation of these vast physical areas which are
vital to all inhabitants of the earth.
Even those principles within
international law specifically formulated to encompass environmental
protection now appear to be increasingly inadequate. "As ecological
problems proliferate, and as the corresponding attention to environmental
problems sharpens, the mutually supportive relationship between the state's
instrumental role and its claims to exercise sovereign power is more likely
to emerge as part of the problem than as part of the solution." 3
In 1972, the first multilateral environmental conference (the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment) was held in Stockholm,
and among its outcomes were the codification of international legal
principles specifically related to the global environment. 4 Principles 21
and 22 of the 1972 Declaration on the Human Environment proclaim that
states have a sovereign right to exploit resources within their own
territories.' Simultaneously, states are obligated to ensure that activities
within their territories do not inflict damage upon any area outside their
respective jurisdictions. Additionally, states are obligated to cooperate in
the further development of international environmental law.6 The notion
of the supremacy of state sovereignty within the international system
underlies these basic principles of international environmental law.
These principles also reinforce the rule of noninterference in the
domestic affairs and jurisdiction of other states as an element of hard
international environmental law.
Ordinarily, states cannot legally
12. For a related discussion of the protocols and amendments to the Antarctic Treaty, see
David S. Russell, Protecting a Land Without a Country: The Antarctic Environmental Protocol,
in 20 ALTERNATIVES: PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIETY, TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT (1993).
13.

CAMILLERI ET AL., supra note 9, at 182.

14.

See DANILENKO, supra note 6, at 409; BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 1.

15.

Id.

16.

Id.
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intervene in the internal functioning of other states. This also includes the
protection of environmental resources which may affect the overall balance
of the global environment. Sovereign states have the legal right to further
development and to pursue policies which are perceived to be in their
national interest, despite environmental consequences which may extend
beyond political boundaries. Does a state, whose jurisdiction happens to
encompass vast amounts of a vital global resource, such as tropical
rainforests, have the right to use and exploit that resource for its own
national use? Under current international law, it certainly does. The legal
maxim of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (the good neighborliness
principle) 7 ensures that state sovereignty takes precedence over global
environmental concerns. "The universal constant of all states-the relation
almost universally acknowledged as a general truth-is that of sovereignty
over resources. The state's definitive, indisputable and uncontested
supremacy over its territory involves a reality which is beyond discussion:
For
permanent sovereignty over the resources of that territory.""
example, the newly industrializing countries in Southeast Asia vehemently
defend their right to develop, a right, as they point out, that the Western
world has already enjoyed. Arguably, if their ability to develop was
impeded by environmental concerns the result would be unjust as Western
states have previously damaged much of the physical environment through
their own quests for industrialization. The principles of international
environmental law do not currently include the necessary measures to
recognize the development of individual states while preserving the global
environment. As a result, the sovereignty of states allows for economic
exploitation at the expense of the physical environment.
However, it is indisputable that natural resources are
interconnected, and serve to sustain ecological and atmospheric conditions
which then enable all species of life, including those of its human
inhabitants, to be supported by the earth. It seems undesirable that any
one state should be able to control the future of much of the world's
population to further its own national interest or economic gain. Yet the
principles of international law encourage this situation. "The global
environmental trends - loss of species, ozone depletion, deforestation on a
scale that affects world climate, and the greenhouse effect itself - all pose
potentially serious losses to national economies, are immune to solution by

17.

BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 1, at 89.

18.

GEORGE ELIAN, THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES

(1979).
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one or a few countries, and render geographic borders irrelevant."'9 These
increasingly urgent environmental crises challenge the traditional concept
of state sovereignty as inherent in the general principles of international
law. The ability of individual states to limit the availability of natural
resources, which in turn affect the availability of further resources outside
political borders, seems irreconcilable with the present need for
cooperative environmental preservation and sustainability.
The legal principle of rebus sic stantibus may also not be entirely
appropriate for the development of international environmental law.
According to this doctrine, grounds for withdrawing from, or terminating
an agreement will occur if the specific situation which existed at the time
the treaty was concluded fundamentally changes in some way.2 In the
context of the global environment, this doctrine could actually work
against specific developments within the field of international
environmental law. Scientific discoveries and subsequent information are
increasing in abundance and are continually evolving to reveal new and
varied environmental circumstances. Thus, states may be in a position to
The
use this legal principle to opt out of previous agreements.
interpretation of rebus sic stantibus by respective states could create
potential loopholes within international law as the continual influx of new
information alters the original environmental situation which was in
existence when a treaty was first signed. After environmental agreements
have been negotiated, it is unclear to what extent the states involved should
allow for the specific circumstances to be altered as more scientific
knowledge becomes available. Although the exact cause and effect of
much global environmental damage is not yet known, this should not be a
hindrance to further international cooperation toward ecological protection.
Almost all states generally agree that ecological damage is occurring
around the world, and that it is possible to reverse this trend. However,
international legal principles do not offer concise direction as to how
binding the terms and content of environmental agreements should be.
The traditional principles of international law were not designed to cope
with an international issue that is truly global in nature and that generally
falls short of providing an adequate framework in which to combat
environmental degradation.

19. Jessica T. Mathews, Introduction and Overview to PRESERVING THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF SHARED LEADERSHIP 31 (Jessica T. Mathews ed., 1991).

20. For a more detailed discussion of this doctrine see STARKE, supra note 1, at 473-76.
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Ill. TREATIES
The design and implementation of international treaties and
agreements within the current framework of international law also appear
to be inadequate to tackle the global crises of environmental degradation.
The treaty-making procedure is too slow and ineffectual to serve as an
effective remedy for the world's rapidly increasing array of environmental
problems. The states' traditional diplomatic approach, currently used as a
context for the creation of global environmental solutions, is itself a
international
develop
effectively
to
framework
nonconducive
environmental law. Instead of formulating urgently needed and explicit
global environmental plans, the traditional international legal system is
hindered by its continuing realist focus on the supremacy of state
sovereignty and its national interest approach to the environment. This
creates basic and limited documents which serve only to reiterate the
problem, and which postpone necessary action.
The signing of a convention can "take the heat off"
political leaders, allowing symbolic but empty promises to
substitute for real improvements. Nations and leaders that
improving
to
commitment
no
absolutely
have
environmental quality can sign a convention and claim
credit for "doing 21 something" when, in fact, there will be
no improvement.
International agreements are introduced and negotiated within the
traditional forum of relatively ad hoc diplomatic conferences. After an
agreement has been signed, the states concerned then proceed through
separate processes of ratification before it becomes legally binding upon its
signatories. A treaty does not become legally binding until a specified
number of states have completed their national ratification process, and
formally agree on the conditions and obligations contained within the
treaty.Y This process is very thorough, and it ensures careful scrutiny by
all signatory states, or a specified quota of them, before an agreement
The
becomes binding on members of the international community.
reasoning behind this process is also to guarantee a "measure of
reciprocity and to avoid situations where initial compliance by a few
21. Lawrence Susskind & Connie Ozawa, Negotiating More Effective International
EnvironmentalAgreements, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: ACTORS,

INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS 147 (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992).
22. For a relevant discussion of the processes of international agreements see Peter Sand,
InternationalCooperation: The Environmental Experience Preservingthe Global Environment, in

THE CHALLENGE OF SHARED LEADERSHIP 240 (Jessica T. Mathews ed., 1991).
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diligent parties would create disproportionate benefits to the 'free-riders'
remaining outside the treaty."

23

Although this procedure for designing international law is very
comprehensive and ensures that a maximum number of states have the
opportunity to carefully consider their level of commitment in various
issues of international law, it is not an adequate framework in which to
create environmental solutions to common global problems.
The
transnational nature of environmental crises, coupled with the recent level
of awareness, creates a unique problem for the traditional framework of
international law. In addition, the necessary time frame for this legal
process to be carried out is simply too long to offer a viable solution to the
impending environmental crises which are rapidly increasing in both
intensity and potential areas of impact. Action must be taken immediately
to salvage the sustainability of the earth's environment. This complex and
prolonged international legal process is a hindrance to rapid agreement and
reaction.
Furthermore,
international
environmental
conditions
are
continually changing and this legal method does not provide a sufficient
level of flexibility which may enable individual states to adapt to rapidly
changing circumstances. Although protocols to a treaty allow for additions
and amendments to be made, this process still requires a level of
participation and consensus which impedes states' collective, and timely
response to impending environmental problems. The legal requirement of
consensus followed by national ratification "creates a built-in time lag,
24
deliberately delaying the effectiveness of international agreements."
A contemporary example of this ineffective legal approach to the
global environment is the process and length of time involved in attempting
to address pressing environmental issues throughout the 1980s and early
1990s. The World Commission on Environment and Development was
created in 1983 by the United Nations General Assembly resolution
38/161,21 to investigate urgent global environmental problems, and to
propose necessary solutions. Four years later, in 1987, the Commission
recommended that "the General Assembly commit itself to preparing a
universal Declaration and later a Convention on environmental protection
and sustainable development."

26

However, it was not until 1992 that the

United Nations held a Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. During the five years in between, a series of
23. Id.
24. Id.
25.

WORLD COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 352.

26. Id. at 333.
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PrepCom meetings was held to draft and refine the treaties to be presented
for signature at Rio. Three nonbinding documents were produced: (1) the
Rio Declaration (which the WCED had specifically recommended); (2) a
Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management,
Conservation, and Sustainable Development of all Types of Forests; and
(3) Agenda 21, a rhetorically extensive framework for global action. In
addition, two binding agreements were produced: the Framework
Convention on Climate Change, and the Convention on Biological
Diversity. 27 However, after signature of these agreements, states then went
through their respective processes of ratification. The Convention on
Biological Diversity did not enter into force until December 29, 1993,2
and the Climate Change Convention entered into force on March 21,
1994,29 ten and eleven years, respectively, after the initial recognition of a
need for global action by the United Nations. States are still continuing to
sign and ratify these agreements because not all states collectively
welcomed their adoption. By the time most states respond to the action
outlined in these treaties, the environmental circumstances will most likely
have changed and deteriorated which will require further refinement and
adjustment to the contents of the agreements. Obviously, the current
treaty-making process is proving to be too arduous and prolonged to offer
timely solutions to global environmental problems.
Additionally, the method of international legal formulation which
consists of the drafting, signature, and ratification of multilaterally
negotiated agreements, followed sometime later by specific protocols, will
only produce the most basic level agreements among states. States are
reluctant to commit themselves to binding and detailed arrangements, and
the international law-making procedures enable them to postpone necessary
cooperative environmental action. Most often, the only agreements which
can be negotiated between any number of states are those that reflect only
the most general and common level of agreement; usually mere
recognition of a problem, and the need for future action. These are lowest
common denominator agreements, and they comprise the majority of
treaties within international environmental law.
At the convention-drafting stage, the goal is typically to
keep discussions at a very general level so that countries
will at least agree that some (unspecified) action is needed

27. See generally Sir Geoffrey Palmer, The Earth Summit: What Went Wrong at Rio?, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 1005 (1992) (overviewing the UNCED documents).
28.

Id.

29. Id.
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to solve a problem. At the protocol-drafting stage, the
goal is usually to find a formula that everyone can accept. 0

Lowest common denominator agreements do not offer a sufficient
means of solving existing, and preventing further, environmental
degradation across the globe. The entire treaty-making process within
international law is ill suited for the rapid, and flexible responses necessary
to alleviate most environmental problems because it does not force states to
negotiate compulsory, timely, and specific means of implementation of
policies. This reflects their preferred adoption of "nonbinding resolutions
or recommendations which set standards which influence the development
of international law at a slower pace, rather than attempting to negotiate
immediately binding rules." 3'
IV. CUSTOM
Custom is most often regarded, and legally interpreted, as the
prime source of international law.
However, it is perceived as
increasingly inadequate to deal with the rapidly intensifying demands upon
the earth's physical environment. Customary international law does not
currently provide states with an adequate framework of reference within
which to formulate their national policies and behavior in relation to the
devastation of the global environment.
A clear and common understanding regarding expected and
appropriate environmental behavior does not exist within the international
legal system. The period of time necessary for a practice in international
relations to have reached the status of customary law has not yet elapsed in
terms of the environment. International legal customs take decades, and
sometimes centuries, to evolve into common and accepted practice. In
terms of state behavior regarding the global environment, normative
practices have not yet had a sufficient amount of time to develop into
customary law. This is a relatively new area of international law as the
first substantial multilateral recognition of international environmental law
occurred only twenty-three years ago at the Stockholm Conference in
1972. Environmental issues, particularly those that are not confined to the
area of one state's territorial jurisdiction, are still most often perceived as
conflicting situations between immediate national economic interests and
long-term environmental regulations. Although most states now recognize
the diminishing global environmental structure, a clear environmental
custom does not exist within international law because a common
30.

SUSSKIND & OZAWA, supra note 21, at 150.

31.

Birnie, The Role of InternationalLaw, supra note 1, at 109.
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established pattern of behavior cannot yet be determined from state
interaction.
In determining whether or not a particular practice has become a
legal custom, two criteria, material and psychological, must be satisfied.
In regard to the material aspect, it must be established that there is
frequent recurrence or repetition of the specific international practice
More importantly, the
among the general community of states."
psychological aspect concerns the transition from the common use of a
practice into a recognized and mutually accepted international legal norm.
When an interstate practice is accepted by the majority of states it acquires
the legal status of opinio juris, and the recognition of this status is a
measure of whether or not a usage is in fact an international custom.3
States become legally bound by common customs when a certain behavior
is generally agreed upon and practiced by the majority of states in the
international community.
However, it cannot be established that various practices within the
developing realm of international environmental law have become
established customs with the common recognition of opinio juris, as states
continue to refer to their own national interests and their respective
domestic legal systems when determining international environmental
Though the need for collective environmental
policies and action.
preservation has basically been acknowledged at the international level
through the formulation and construction of various environmental
established collective
legal recognition of global
agreements,
environmental practices remains to be seen.
Under international law, states become bound by the laws that they
collectively create. Both rights and responsibilities are accepted by states
within the international community and within the traditional framework of
international law. The law is equally applicable to all sovereign states, and
individual states become both protected and obligated by established
collective customs. The concept of jus cogens reflects the further status of
a practice in international law which is intrinsic to the international system,
and cannot be broken without cost. "The law of state responsibility also
developed the idea of jus cogens, or mandatory norms . . . .[Specifically]
the jus cogens idea was that there are certain norms of such transcending
These
importance that states may not avoid them unilaterally."34
peremptory norms of international law exist to protect the overall interests
32.

STARKE, supra note 1, at 38.

33.

id. at 39.

34.
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of the global community and to uphold basic human rights. It is a
recognized element of international law that jus cogens norms are
fundamental to the traditional legal system.
Currently, environmental rights and responsibilities are not
recognized as having this legal status, despite the fact that global
environmental preservation represents an essential interest of all
individuals within the entire international society. Sufficient time has not
yet passed to enable environmental issues to evolve to this status of
international law. The establishment of peremptory norms must develop
from a specific practice for an extended period of time by the general
majority of states.
Presently, the observation that the interests of the international
community, in its entirety, are being adequately protected by customs
within international environmental law cannot be made. The degradation
of the world's rainforests, the continuing depletion of the atmospheric
ozone layer, and the increasing spread of decertification are all evidence
that environmental legal customs do not sufficiently regulate the actions of
states under international law. The majority of states have not consented
to the regulation of the use of various natural resources, and it is a difficult
task to discern any definite established environmental practices among
states.
The quest as to whether a rule has the character of jus
cogens must begin by finding out whether it belongs to
general international law. It must be established that the
rule is binding upon the great majority of States, in other
words, that the international community, by and large, has
35
consented to its content.
Based upon the current state of the earth's physical environment, it would
appear that the majority of members of the international community do not
regard themselves as being bound by established environmental customary
precedent, opinio juris, or by the mandatory regulation of national action
by jus cogens norms.
V.

CONCLUSION

Planet earth has never before faced such global environmental
crises as it does now, and its inhabitants have never before been so
informed as to the damage that has been caused and the action that needs
to be taken. The traditional state system is unable to cope with the recent
35.
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and unique global phenomenon of environmental degradation.
The
relations between sovereign states are governed by rules of legal tradition
based upon the necessity to reduce conflict and competition between the
worlds political entities. The supremacy of state sovereignty has been
documented throughout the international legal tradition, but this system is
at odds With formulating collective and cooperative responses to the
ecological threats of its own creation.
The three main sources of international law explored in this
paper-custom, treaties, and general principles of law-comprise an
inadequate international framework as they do not provide states with an
appropriate guide with which to respond to a varied and increasing number
The system of international law,
of global environmental crises.
specifically investigated through an explanation of these three components,
does not currently provide the members of the world community with a
coherent and common direction in terms of the environment. The nature
of the interstate, sovereign system prevents an immediate and effective
response.
"The emergence of an increasingly urgent environmental
agenda in the closing years of the twentieth century demonstrates ever
more starkly the incongruity between the physical properties of the
biosphere and the image of a world partitioned36 hermetically and
immutably, into fixed domains of sovereign authority."
The collection of norms and rules which comprise the sources of
international law presently falls short of providing an effective means
toward the end of environmental salvation. Effective environmental legal
action is incompatible with the general principles of international law.
Current legal action is not effectively carried out by the processes of
international treaties and not fully incorporated within the recognized
source of custom. The issue that must now be urgently addressed by the
international society, comprised of a greater range of its members, is how
to adapt those traditional principles of international law which reduce
conflict and tension to the open coordination of cooperative universal
solutions toward environmental sustainability.
There needs to be a greater inclusion of various groups and
individuals who have an inherent interest in the sustainability of the earth's
environment, motivated either by protection of social, economic, or
Specifically, multinational corporations and
survival interests.
nongovernmental organizations should be given greater recognition, rights,
obligations, and responsibilities at the international level of legal

36. CAMILLERI ET AL., supra note 9, at 195.

1995]

Singleton-Cambage

187

negotiations, as they have a realistic impact on the ecological and social
structure of various regions.
The traditional concepts of international law, as explored in these
three main sources, should be adapted to reflect the situation of the earth's
environment, and the structure of international society as it presently
exists. Failing to do so will leave various ecosystems of the earth
permanently scarred, and a heavy and unjust burden will be borne by
future generations. The damage presently being inflicted on the delicate
natural balance of the earth will diminish available resources for years to
come, and a collective global response must be undertaken immediately to
reverse this pattern of ecological and atmospheric degradation.

